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Welfare Incentives and Interstate Migration:
An Analysis of the Migration Decisions of Poor, Single Mothers
John Weis
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of welfare incentives in the
decision to move for poor, single mothers. Using micro-level data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and other sources, I develop an econometric
model that estimates the influence of state welfare benefits on the interstate
migration decisions of poor, single mothers, whether that be moving from states
with low benefits or to states with high benefits. This study builds upon previous
literature concerning interstate migration by considering new methodological
approaches and theoretical models. Ultimately, the evidence suggests that while
the welfare benefits offered at the current state of residence and those at potential
states of residence influence the migration decisions of poor, single mothers, the
effects are modest.

I. Introduction
Under The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
replaced Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as a primary federal
cash assistance program. The provisions of TANF obligated states to individually
develop their own welfare systems. As a result, there was a rapid and substantial
increase in the diversification of welfare policies between states relative to the
past (Blank, 2002). These diversified welfare rules and benefit levels potentially
provide greater incentives for poor families to move to those states offering
greater benefits levels in order to receive more financial aid (De Jong, Graefe,
and St. Pierre, 2005). Of those affected by welfare incentives, poor, single
mothers comprise the subgroup of the population most likely to be influenced
by greater welfare benefits given their comparatively difficult situation (Levine
and Zimmerman, 1999). Thus, if a welfare-induced migration phenomenon does
exist, it is most likely present in the migration decisions of poor, single mothers.
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As such, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the migration decisions of poor,
single mothers by estimating to what extent they move from low welfare benefit
states to high welfare benefit states.
The economic significance of welfare-induced migration has been welldocumented. Assuming the poor can afford the cost of moving, states with lax
welfare requirements or large benefit payments could experience considerable
influxes of populations largely comprised of poor families (Gelbach, 2004).
Having to bear the burden of the additional poor population has concerned states
for decades (Meyer, 2000). In response, setting lower benefit levels or stricter
eligibility requirements for a state can disincentivize poor families from moving
there (Cushing, 2002).

However, multiple states attempting to accomplish

the above can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ wherein states compete to export
their poverty burden by offering progressively lower welfare payment benefits
(Brueckner, 2000). Evidence of the efforts by states to outcompete other states
to avoid poverty populations has been well-documented (see Figlio et al. (1998)
and Saavedra (1998)). The efforts by state policymakers have even led to several
prominent Supreme Court cases (Shapiro v. Thompson [1969] and Saenz v. Roe
[1999]) in which residency requirements for welfare payment were deemed
unconstitutional (Gelbach, 2004). Overall, the results of the economic policy
and changes to welfare systems enacted by states have tangible impacts on the
well-being of those individuals and families living in poverty. Since the lives of
individuals are dependent upon state-specific objectives influenced by welfareinduced migration concerns, the economic significance of welfare-induced
migration is clear.
My interest in the research subject developed from two primary sources
of personal significance. Firstly, as will be developed later, the literature on the
topic is largely inconclusive. This represents an opportunity for someone to make
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a significant contribution and have a lasting impact on the discourse surrounding
the issue. Additionally, because the research is uncertain, any significant research
could have substantial policy implications for state policymakers. Secondly, I
have always had a general interest in welfare policy and the effects of said policy
(in this case potentially adverse effects). While the purpose of the paper is largely
exploratory in nature, exposing potential shortcomings of welfare policy, it also
serves as an attempt to promote better practices for policymakers by encouraging
a deeper consideration of the consequences of state policies. The hope is that
this research paper may, in some way, generate progress in the form of more
appropriate policy.
As stated earlier, this paper will investigate the degree to which poor,
single mothers move from low welfare benefit states to high welfare benefit states.
In the next section, a brief survey of relevant welfare migration literature will
be provided. Afterwards, using the theoretical frameworks provided by recent
welfare-induced migration research, an econometric model will be developed
to analyze the research question from an alternative perspective. In the section
that follows, the description of data and data collection will be presented. In
the penultimate section, the empirical results of the econometric model will be
discussed. Lastly, I will conclude with a brief summary of the study’s findings
and implications for future research.

II. Literature Review
In developing the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis of local public
expenditures, Tiebout (1956) became one of the first individuals to discuss, albeit
indirectly, the potential for welfare-induced migration. While the focus of the
original paper was on the role that the mobility of workers played in promoting
an efficient allocation of public goods, underlying ideas and concepts are directly
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applicable to research on welfare-induced migration. Specifically, the concept
that individuals moved to states or regions which offer a bundle of goods that
maximize their utility has served as a primary motivating factor in the decision to
move.
According to Moffitt (1992), early researchers in the 1970s only had
access to aggregated data, making it impractical to identify poverty populations.
They were forced to rely on race as a proxy variable for poverty. Furthermore,
they failed to account for important state-level differences, such as unemployment
rates, in their analyses of the migration decision-making process for families.
Therefore, research in the 1970s is generally discounted (Cushing, 2002).
Meanwhile, the research of the 1980s remedied shortcomings of
previous work with the aid of microdata which gave them the ability to directly
observe poverty populations. In this period, Gramlich and Laren (1984), Friedli
(1986), Blank (1988), Cebula and Koch (1989), Peterson and Rom (1989), and
Dye (1990) all conducted studies that found strong evidence for the existence of
a welfare effect on the decision to move for poor families. Most of the work at
this time made use of the newly available Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS) to
examine welfare-induced migration. Compelling evidence that suggest opposing
conclusions during the same time period is relatively scarce, if not entirely
nonexistent.
Of course, if there was such an overwhelming consensus today, I would
be doing research on a different topic. In fact, the research conducted since the
early 1990s has witnessed a significant split in general opinion. Hanson and
Hartman (1994), Borjas (1998), Gelbach (2004), and Snarr (2011) all reached
conclusions supportive of a substantial influence of welfare benefits on the
decision to move. Conversely, Walker (1994, 1995), Allard and Danziger (2000),
Kennan and Walker (2010) failed to find any evidence of a welfare effect on the
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decision to move. These two groups represent different extremes with most of
the research reaching conclusions that lie somewhere in between these two sides.
Specifically, Frey et al (1996), Enchautegui (1997), Schram, Nitz, and Krueger
(1998), Levine and Zimmerman (1999), Meyer (2000), Kaestner, Kaushal, and
Van Ryzin (2003), Gelbach (2004), and McKinnish (2005, 2007) have all found
results suggesting there is welfare-induced migration but that this effect is fairly
modest. Unfortunately, direct comparisons are difficult to establish given the
drastically different methods employed in literature. As suggested by Snarr
(2011), the reason for such large discrepancies in the literature is that there is no
strong theoretical justification for any particular model or research design, the
literature is largely empirical. Therefore, all of the research is justifiable in its
own right, insinuating that more effort has to be taken in establishing a stronger
theoretical foundation or basis for the field so that a consensus may be reached.
The principal difference between the empirical studies lies in their
research methods, particularly how they decide to measure the decision to migrate
between states, and how they decide to model such a decision. For instance,
Walker (1994) and Levine and Zimmerman (1999), like early empirical studies,
examine population flows into states (inmigration) and out of states (outmigration)
for different groups. Meyer (2000) decides to compare differences in welfare
participation rates between those who migrate to another state and those who do
not. McKinnish (2005, 2007) studies the differences in welfare expenditures at
the county-level between border counties of adjacent states. Blank (1988) adopts
a less conventional and more time-consuming choice model of location which
develops a more theoretical foundation than most research in the literature. Unlike
prior work, Frey et. al (1996) treats the decision to move as a sequential decisionmaking process where individuals first decide if they are going to migrate and
then where to migrate using a nested logit framework. While some of these works
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reach similar conclusions, the only other thing they have in common as that they
all adopt drastically different fundamental approaches to the research question.
This notion is consistent for the entire literature of welfare-induced migration.
The second major difference between the studies in the literature that
contributes to their differing conclusions is the choice of data employed by
the researchers. As with the research methods, there is no strong theoretical
foundation supporting any particular data set, especially considering that the
choice of data is dependent on the methodology employed. For example, Levine
and Zimmerman (1999) and Kennan and Walker (2010) make use of data from
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) for examining young, female
subpopulations. Breuckner (2000) and Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003)
use TANF-era data while Schram, Nitz, and Krueger (1998) and Gelbach (2004)
utilize the Public Use Microdata Series derived from the U.S. Census. Allard and
Danziger (2000) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Despite all of
the different data sets, the U.S. Census is perhaps the most commonly used data
source. Enchautegui (1997) uses data from the 1980 U.S. Census, Meyer (2000)
uses the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data, and Frey et. al (1996) uses the 1990 U.S.
Census data. Again, the differences in Censuses used are largely dependent on
the individual study and how they decided to examine welfare-induced migration.
Ultimately, the differences in methodology and data combine to form two of the
prominent factors leading to the general inconclusive nature of the literature.

III. Research Methods and Modeling
Given the preponderance of logit and probit models in the literature4, the
econometric model developed in this study follows the probit framework. The
primary advantage of this model over other probabilistic models, specifically the
4

Blank (1988); Frey et. al (1996); Enchautegui (1997); Levine and Zimmerman (1999); Davies,
Greenwood, and Li (2001); Cushing (2003); Bailey (2005); Gelbach (2004).
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Linear Probability Model (LPM), is that the effect of explanatory variables (e.g.
welfare benefit levels) can estimated to dynamically influence the likelihood of an
event. Additional benefits include imposing limits on the likelihood of an event
(i.e. the probability of an event cannot be greater than 1 or less than 0).
The dependent variable measures whether or not the poor, single mother
family moved from one state to another. The explanatory variables in the model
are the level of welfare benefits for a family of four offered in the current state of
residence as well as the level offered in the previous state of residence. These
variables encapsulate the potential welfare effect. The control variables are
established by previous literature5. I estimate the following probit model:
PR(MIGRATED) = Φ (B0 + B1HDAGE + B2HDEDUC+ B3HDEXPER
+ B4NOKIDS + B5AGEYNG + B6BLACK + B7RACEOTHER +
B8WELFLAST + B9MAXBEN + B10MAXBENLAST + B11UNEMP +
B12UNEMPLAST+ B13DISTANCE)

where
AGEHD = Age of head of household
HDEDUC = Education of head of household
HDEXPER = Experience of head of household
NOKIDS = Number of kids
AGEYNG = Age of youngest child
BLACK = 1 if head of household is black, 0 otherwise
RACEOTHER = 1 if head of household is non-white and non-black, 0 otherwise
WELFLAST = 1 if family was on welfare last year, 0 otherwise
MAXBEN = Maximum welfare benefits for a single-parent family of four in
current state
MAXBENLAST = Maximum welfare benefits for a single-parent family of four
in previous state
UNEMP = Unemployment rate in current state
UNEMPLAST=Unemployment rate in previous state
DISTANCE = Log of population-weighted greater area circle distance between
previous state and contiguous state with highest welfare benefit offering
5

Rogers (1968); Todaro (1969); DaVanzo (1978); Tienda and Wilson(1992); Enchautegui (1997)
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Using the previous literature, I generate expectations for the signs of dependent
variables in Table 1 below.
Table 1

ble 1

Variable

Sign

HDAGE
HDEDUC
HDEXPER
NOKIDS
AGEYNG
BLACK
RACEOTHER
WELFLAST
MAXBEN
MAXBENLAST
UNEMP
UNEMPLAST
DISTANCE

Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative

Briefly discussing the expected signs of the coefficient estimates, one would
expect that being older, having more kids, and having older kids would all
decrease the likelihood of migrating from a convenience standpoint. Being black
or another non-white and non-black race would also potentially decrease the
likelihood of moving for these families as they generally have less income and,
therefore, an inability to afford moving. We would also expect greater education
and experience for the head of household to decrease the likelihood of moving
because they are aware of the negative impacts moving can have on a family,
especially the children. Being the focus of the research question, we would expect
that greater welfare benefits of the previous state would have a negative influence
on the likelihood of moving (i.e. they wouldn’t need to move) and that greater
welfare benefits in the current state would have positive influence on the likelihood
of having moved (i.e. they moved to get the benefits). The unemployment signs
can be interpreted similarly.
IV. Data
1.

Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1968 -2007
The primary data set used in this econometric analysis will be the

Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 2007. Developed by the
Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan in 1968, the
PSID is a longitudinal data set comprised of both individual and family level data
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collected for a variety of variables every year. While the previous discussion on
the uncertainty of data selection in the literature suggested that any sufficient data
set can be justified, the U.S. Census seemed to be the most universally accepted.
The justification for the decision to use the PSID instead of the U.S. Census
is twofold. Firstly, PSID data was readily available and easy to manipulate to
generate the necessary sample data. Secondly, migration in the U.S. Census data
is indicated by a person living in a different state than five years prior. In effect,
migration in each U.S. Census would only account for moves for every five years.
In contrast, because the data comprising the PSID is collected every year, one is
able to find yearly migration patterns. This allows for a more dynamic analysis
than the U.S. Census could provide.
An additional fact to note, the PSID sample data used in the analysis was
not the raw data but rather a subset of the data. More precisely, the sample PSID
data is comprised of only poor, single females who have been heads of household
at some point in their life. This was the best representative sample for examining
the decision of poor, single mothers to move. Assuming the decision to move is
largely determined by the head of household, being a head of household would be
a prerequisite for a mother to be able to make the decision to move. While there
are potential issues of specification bias involved with using a specific subset, for
the sake of answering the research question, it is necessary. Overall, the PSID
data set accounts for all variables in the model except for unemployment rates,
welfare benefits, and the distances between states.
Most of the variables from this data set included in the econometric
model were used in their raw form. However, the dummy variables for black
and raceother were derived using the variable for race, with white serving as the
omitted condition.
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2.

Bob Moffitt Welfare Guarantee Variables
The first supplemental data set was independently developed by

established scholar Bob Moffitt and aggregates a variety of data from a wide
array of sources. With respect to this analysis, the data set contains information
on unemployment rates of states and the maximum payment benefit for a singleparent, family of four from 1968 to 1996. As a note, the identification of welfare
benefits in the model was at the state level instead of the county level, even
though welfare benefits vary across counties for some states. While county
level information was available for individuals in the PSID, there was no clear
procedure to assign the welfare benefits to the counties across time using the
Moffitt dataset and the HHS dataset, described below. As such, the welfare
benefits levels used for states with varying welfare benefit levels across counties
was that of the county with the greatest proportion of the total state population
and, therefore, the most likely destination for a mover.
Available at www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/ben_doc.pdf
3.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
The second supplemental data set was developed by the Urban Institute

for the Welfare Rules Database. The data set contains maximum payment benefits
for a single-parent family of four data from 1996 to 2007.
Available at http://anfdata.urban.org/WRD
4.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
The third supplemental data set used consisted of the historical tables of

average state unemployment rate for each state from 1996 to 2007.
5.

Greater Circle State Distances
The final supplement data provides data on the log of the population-

weighted greater circle distance between any two states. The population weights
are used to determine population centers of states while the greater circle
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ble 2

measures incorporate the curvature of the earth in the calculation of distances
between these population centers. In the context of this analysis, the distance
variable measures the distance between the state of residence in the previous year
and a potential state, determined by finding the contiguous state with the greatest
welfare benefits offerings. This variable will serve as a proxy variable for the
moving costs associated with interstate migration.
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, derived and described
previously, were also generated as shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Variable
HDAGE
HDEDUC
HDEXPER

Mean
31.20968
6.905973
17.61352

Std. Dev.
11.60559
9.568182
33.955

Min

Max

0

99

0

99

0

99

NOKIDS

1.596788

1.523294

0

11

AGEYNG

3.516814

4.255007

0

17

BLACK

0.752964

0.4313111

0

1

RACEOTHER

0.0472085

0.2120959

0

1

WELFLAST

0.3798314

0.4853713

0

1

385.2062

179.7597

60

1064

MAXBENLAST 380.7177

177.7997

55.02

1064

MAXBEN

UNEMP

6.542549

2.066404

2.1

15.5

UNEMPLAST

6.541871

2.105017

2.1

15.5

DISTANCE

4.583395

3.234206

0.384506

11.2152

Given prior knowledge, none of the variables seem particularly strange,
although 99 years for the age of head, education and experience is relatively
concerning. Further inspection of the data reveals that there are only a few
observations with this problem, mostly from the earlier years of the dataset when
there was likely more measurement error.
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V. Empirical Results
Estimating the econometric model, I obtained the regression output
shown in Table 3 below.
Table Table
3 3
Variable

Coefficient

t-Score

HDAGE

-0.038255

-5.47

0.000*

-0.0016894

HDEDUC

-0.0013423

-0.31

0.759

-0.0000593

HDEXPER

0.0047558

1.81

0.070**

0.00021

NOKIDS

-0.0741016

-1.69

0.091**

-0.0032724

AGEYNG

-0.0229523

-1.52

0.129

-0.0010136

BLACK

-0.131427

01.06

0.291

-0.006228

RACEOTHER

-0.0319729

-0.15

0.882

-0.0013707

WELFLAST

-0.5434885

-4.35

0.000*

-0.024173

MAXBEN

0.0012908

2.36

0.018*

0.000057

MAXBENLAST

-0.0013529

-2.42

0.015*

-0.0000597

UNEMP

-0.2134598

-3.26

0.001*

-0.0094266

UNEMPLAST

0.1289763

2.05

0.040*

0.0056957

DISTANCE

0.019423

1.25

0.212

0.008577

N = 3001

Prob > chi2(13)
= 0.0000

Psuedo R2 =
0.1567

P-value

Marginal Effects

Log likelihood =
-375.42839

Before interpreting the regression output for the probit regression, it was
important to run an alternative regression model (LPM) to allow for the testing of
common regression issues. Issues of heteroskedasticity were present in the model,
namely in the hdage, hdeduc, and hdexper variables, as evidenced by the BreuschPagan Test and White’s Test for heteroskedasticity and accompanying graphical
analyses. In response, one could employ robust standard errors. Additionally,
problems of multicollinearity where found, using variable inflation factors,
particularly between unemp and unemplast, and maxbenlast and maxben. This
is unsurprising since these variables are strongly collinear (only approximately 5
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percent of the total observations actually migrate to another state). Since dropping
or transforming these key variables would negate the analysis hitherto, nothing
will be done, although one should remain mindful of the negative consequences
of multicollinearity. Lastly, we find evidence of model misspecification using the
Ramsey RESET test. The most obvious functional form issue lies in the omission
of a squared term for distance whose addition may improve the model as the
effect of distance on the likelihood of moving may increase at a decreasing rate.
For further information on these tests, refer to the Appendix.
Enacting the remedies for these regression issues, most notably the
addition of a distance-squared term, I generated the regression output depicted in
Table 4 below.
Table 4

Table 4
Variable

Coefficient

t-Score

HDAGE

-0.0391325

-5.52

0.000*

-0.0016446

HDEDUC

-0.0019966

-0.45

0.656

-0.0000839

P-value

Marginal Effects

HDEXPER

0.0051451

1.95

0.051**

0.0002162

NOKIDS

-0.0814076

-1.82

0.068**

-0.0034214

AGEYNG

-0.0225078

-1.46

0.143

-0.000946

BLACK

-0.0696176

-0.55

0.582

-0.0030258

RACEOTHER

0.0122366

0.06

0.955

-0.0005202

WELFLAST

-0.5492922

-4.36

0.000*

-0.0232821

MAXBEN

0.0012441

2.28

0.023*

0.0000523

MAXBENLAST

-0.0010184

-1.79

0.074**

-0.0000428

UNEMP

-0.220425

-3.36

0.001*

-0.009264

UNEMPLAST

0.1242484

1.97

0.049*

0.0052219

DISTANCE

0.2361678

3.07

0.002*

0.0099256

DISTANCESQ

-0.017081

-2.89

0.004*

-0.0007179

N = 3001

Prob > chi2(13)
= 0.0000

Psuedo R2 =
0.1666

Log likelihood =
-371.02267

All of the coefficient estimates with a single asterisk were found to be statistically significant at the
0.05 significance level while those with a double asterisk were found to be statistically significant at
the 0.10 significance level.
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All of the signs of the coefficient estimates on the variables were found to
be in accord with prior expectations except for the sign of the coefficient estimate
on hdexper, which was presumed to have the same sign as hdeduc (i.e. positive).
The exact cause of this discrepancy is difficult to discern, but hdeduc and hdexper
moving in opposite directions does not seem entirely intuitive. Overall, all of
the coefficient estimates were found to be statistically significant at the 0.10
significance level except for those on the education of the head of household,
the race dummies, and the age of the youngest child. However, these coefficient
estimates being statistically insignificant does not necessarily impact the research
question in any substantial manner.
Interestingly, we find that coefficient estimate on maxben is significant
at the 0.05 significance level while the coefficient estimate on maxbenlast is
significant at the 0.10 significance level. This suggests that, given the sign of these
coefficients, as the benefit level of the previous state decreases, the probability of
moving increases and that as the benefit level of the current state increases, the
probability of having moved increases. Taken in conjunction, these results suggest
that the population of poor, single mothers move from states with low welfare
benefits to states that offer high welfare benefits. In effect, this is evidence that the
phenomenon of welfare incentives may exist for poor, single mothers, incentivizing
them to move to other states in order to receive higher benefits.
Further analysis of the magnitude of the marginal effects of the
coefficient estimates is necessary to determine whether the welfare effect is
economically significant. In order to accomplish this analysis, I use the marginal
effects generated by the regression analysis to estimate the effect of certain benefit
levels on the likelihood of moving to another state for poor, single mothers.
More precisely, I develop a general range of effects for both benefit variables,
ranging from two standard deviations below the respective mean benefit level to
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two standard deviations above said mean. With respect to the Maxben variable, I
calculate a predicted increase in the likelihood of moving for poor, single mothers
ranging from 0.134 percent to 3.895 percent at benefit levels of 25.69 dollars and
744.73 dollars, respectively. Similarly, with respect to the Maxbenlast variable, I
calculate a predicted decrease in the likelihood of moving for poor, single mothers
ranging from 0.108 percent to 3.151 percent at benefit levels of 25.12 dollars and
736.32 dollars, respectively. Thus, the role of welfare benefits in the migration
decisions of poor, single mothers ranges from fairly inconsequential to somewhat
substantial. Still, even at their most substantial, the influence on the decision to
move is relatively minimal. Overall, these results largely agree with the majority
of the prior literature on welfare incentives which found a statistical significant
but economically modest role for welfare incentives.
Additionally worth discussing, adding the distancesq term to the
regression analysis made both the coefficient estimate on it and distance
statistically significant at even the 0.01 significance level. Clearly, being as
the purpose of these variables was to control for the cost of moving, one would
imagine that they would play a significant role, even if they were not the best
proxy for moving costs. Taken in conjunction, these variables suggest that as
the distance between the current state and a potential state with greater benefits
increases, the probability of moving increases but at a decreasing rate. This does
not make theoretical sense as, presumably, greater distances would decrease the
likelihood of moving because of greater moving costs. A better proxy for moving
costs, given the likely measurement error in this variable, may alleviate this
inconsistency.
Furthermore, we find that the coefficient estimates on the unemployment
variables were statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. This evidence
suggests that employment opportunities play an important role in the decision to
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role for poor, single mothers. Given their difficult situation, greater employment
opportunities, as measured by the unemployment rate of states, would reasonably
provide incentives for moving. Even so, the marginal effects of these coefficient
estimates are relatively small when considering that a one percentage increase
in the unemployment rate of the previous state would increase the likelihood of
moving by less than 1 percent, as predicted by the model.
Given the diagnostic tests run, there is some concern that these results may
not be valid but, beyond basic amendments, any significant changes to the model
may itself invalidate the ability of the model to address the research question.
While issues of heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity are concerning, however,
they would not necessary nullify any of the conclusions of the model, but they do
suggest that the probit framework may not be the ideal model for answering the
research question, at least in the incarnation used in this analysis. Recently, the
literature on welfare incentives in migration decisions has begun to adapt optimal
choice models wherein an individual must consider multiple locations across the
country before deciding where to move. Comparatively, the model used in this
analysis was relatively simplistic, which may not be ideal given that the decision
to move can be very complex. Furthermore, these issues may arise as a result of
poor identification of explanatory variables, although the problem does not seem
as severe as it was prior to several amendments.

VI. Conclusions
In order to investigate how the migration decisions of poor, single
mothers migrate were influenced by the welfare benefits offered by states, I chose
to estimate a basic econometric probit model. Using prior research to determine
relevant control variables and data from a variety of sources, I tested my model
and found evidence for a modest influence of welfare incentives on the decision
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to move for poor, single mothers. Most of variables included in the model were
found to be statistically significant with appropriate signs at the designated
significance level, suggesting that poor, single mothers do move from states with
low welfare benefits to those with high welfare benefits.
These results are generally in accord with the majority of the literature on
welfare incentives and interstate migration, which finds modest roles for welfare
incentives in the decision to move. The policy implications of this study, and those
that found similar conclusions, are vast. Specifically, the foundation of a ‘race to the
bottom’ between states is largely unfounded if welfare incentives do substantially
influence decisions to move. As such, the only effect of competing to offer lower
benefits may be to simply worsen the standard of living for poor populations rather
than export those populations. Ultimately, while state legislators should consider
welfare incentives when changing welfare policy, it should not be a primary
consideration. Further research into the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon, how
much state legislators consider welfare incentives when crafting policy, and the
potential impacts of the latter on the poverty population are all advents for further
research. Within the scope of the literature, further consideration should be given
towards developing a more theoretical foundation so that a greater consensus in
the literature can be obtained, at the very least establishing theoretical preference
to certain datasets or methodologies.

Otherwise, it will remain impractical

to compare the conclusions of these widely differing analyses. In addition to
further consideration to these topics, the econometric model may be improved by
utilizing an optimal choice framework, better indentifying explanatory variables,
and obtaining better measurements for certain variables such as moving costs.
If done, one may be able to obtain even better evidence for the moderate role of
welfare incentives in the decision to move, especially as relates to poor, single
mothers.
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Appendix

Tests for Heteroskedascity
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of chgstate
chi2(1)

=

200.41

Prob > chi2

=

0.0000

White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(100)

=

1814.64

Prob > chi2

=

0.0000

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |

chi2

df

p

---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |

1814.64

100

0.0000

Skewness |

452.91

13

0.0000

Kurtosis |

84.66

1

0.0000

---------------------+----------------------------Total |

2352.22

114

0.0000

---------------------------------------------------
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Test for Multicollinearity
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------UNEMPLAST |
27.66
0.036159
UNEMP |
27.62
0.036208
MAXBENLAST |
23.18
0.043146
MAXBEN |
23.15
0.043195
BLACK |
1.47
0.682390
WELFLAST |
1.28
0.778561
RACEOTHER |
1.28
0.782762
NOKIDS |
1.27
0.785496
AGEHD |
1.17
0.853040
DISTANCE |
1.15
0.865918
HDEXPER |
1.14
0.876884
AGEYNG |
1.09
0.915698
HDEDUC |
1.04
0.963181
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
8.65
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